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THE RULE OF LAW AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS*

Luke K. Cooperriderf
anecdote which I believe I recall from one of Professor Brogan's ·writings concerns a conversation between the archbishop
and the chief justice about the relative importance of their respective powers. After the conversation had continued for some time
the archbishop sought to administer the coup de grace. "I have the
advantage of you, your lordship, because you see, in the long run,
the most you can say to a man is, 'You shall be hanged!' whereas it
is within the functions of my office to say, 'You shall be damned!' "
To this, after a moment of thought, the chief justice replied, "Yes,
your worship, your point is persuasive. But you overlook one matter. In the long run, if, I say 'You shall be hanged,' -you will be
hanged."
The point which this anecdote rather remotely suggests, and
which I wish to pursue today, is that the judge, too, is a center of
power. He too is capable of action which may bear very heavily
upon the individual. It is therefore appropriate to inquire into
his exercise of this power, and the limits which the Rule of Law
concept may or may not erect about him. I hasten to add that
in so doing I am directing your attention to a small fraction of the
whole meaning which has been found in the expression which is
the subject for our series of lectures. Professor Harvey dealt with
the concept broadly, and in historical depth yesterday, suggesting
many of the problems of definition which are involved, and particularly calling to your attention the need for external standards
of criticism for the law itself. Knowing that this was his assignment,
and that four other lecturers would follow after me to consider
other special applications of the idea, I have felt secure in going
today to what we might call the internal operation of the Rule of
Law in the context of the judicial process.
After examining a fraction of the literature on the subject,
one would have to conclude that the meaning of the expression is
elusive. Some ·writers have defined it rather carefully - but in
somewhat inconsistent terms. For others it seems to have a meaning
roughly equivalent to "good government." It would be my guess
that judges and laivyers have always been its most enthusiastic
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votaries, for it seems to creep into the balance on the side of the
judges in any contest in which they may be involved, and emerges
primarily as a limitation upon the executive and legislative
branches of government. A recent example of this interpretation of
its role is to be found in the Declaration of Delhi, promulgated in
1959 by an international congress of jurists consisting of 185 judges,
practicing lawyers and teachers of law from 53 countries, which
states the conclusions of that august assemblage on the Rule of Law
and the administration of justice throughout the world. The Declaration contains a praiseworthy list of prescriptions for the legislature, which must not discriminate in its laws on the basis of race,
religion or sex, must not interfere with freedom of religious belief
and observance, must not deny to the members of society the right
to elected, responsible government, must not place restrictions on
freedom of speech, assembly and association, must abstain from
retroactive legislation, must not impair the exercise of fundamental
rights and freedoms of the individual, and must provide procedural
machinery and safeguards whereby the above-mentioned freedoms
are given effect and protected. There is concern also for the executive, that any delegation to it of legislative power should be narrowly limited, carefully defined, and subject to judicial review, that
its acts generally which directly affect personal rights should be
subject to review, that any person injured by an illegal executive
act should have his remedy against the state or against the wrongdoing official, that hearing procedures should be established antecedent to executive action, and there is most particular concern
with criminal procedures. When the congress turns its attention
to the judicial branch, however, the atmosphere suddenly clears;
the aura of suspicion is dispersed. Permit me to quote from the
Declaration itself:
"An independent Judiciary is an indispensable requisite of
a free society under the Rule of Law. Such independence
implies freedom from interference by the Executive or Legislative with the exercise of the judicial function, but does not
mean that the judge is entitled to act in an arbitrary manner.
His duty is to interpret the law and the fundamental principles and assumptions that underlie it. It is implicit in the
concept of independence set out in the present paragraph that
provision should be made for the adequate remuneration of
the judiciary . . ."

and the Declaration then continues, to concern itself only with
methods of appointment and removal of judges, their tenure and
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security of office, and with the necessity to the maintenance of the
Rule of Law that there be an organized and independent legal
profession. The concern, in other words, is not to impose limitations, but rather to protect the judiciary against incursion and coercion from the other branches.
One might gain the impression from this and similar statements that the Rule of Law had been defined primarily in terms of
ultimate rule by Ia-vryers and judges; that an independent judiciary
with the final say in disputes between individuals, and between
individuals and government, is itself the objective which we seek
to achieve and maintain; that the phrase "Rule of Law," in other
words, refers to an arrangement whereby independent judges hold
the check-reins on government, rather than to the extent to which
law, as any kind of a system of prescriptions concerning human
conduct, enters into and influences the conduct of officials. There
is a curious variance between the content of the idea, so elaborated,
and the literal meaning of the words chosen for its expression. That
variance suggests inquiry.
The words, in their literal meaning, suggest not the judges
but the law as the ultimate reference. At one time that conception
would have been thought quite natural. It is epitomized, perhaps
in an extreme form, by Marshall's statement, "Judicial power, as
contradistinguished from the power of laws, has no existence.
Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing."1
The statement sounds quaint to modem ears, but I wonder whether
we can dispense completely with the judicial mores which it suggests, metaphorically to be sure.
What is this peculiar virtue of the judicial method which sets
the judiciary apart to be specially protected and left to act without
inhibition from other officials? Judicial procedures of course may
be praised for their own virtues. They aim to achieve that quality
of fairness between the parties which is represented by the idea of
entitlement to a day in court and to an independent and impartial
tribunal. Over and above this principle of fair treatment, however,
contemporary commentators seem to hesitate to find any stronger
implications in the Rule of Law idea than that a judicial decision
should be "reasoned, rationally justified, in terms that take due
account both of the demands of general principle and the demands
of the particular situation."2 I find myself unable to believe that
these aspects of judicial procedure are the basic reasons why we
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824).
2 Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 143, 145 (1958).

1
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instinctively call for the judge when individual claims and interests
are at stake; why we are adamant that he should be left entirely
alone; why we expect him to come fonvard as the final arbiter in
any dispute between citizen and officialdom. The judiciary has no
copyright upon its procedures, which could easily be utilized by
other branches on appropriate occasions. Is it not, rather, that the
procedures are subservient to the end which is sought, the resolution of the claim in accordance with pre-established criteria? If so,
the true reason why judicial proceedings are held in such high
regard is found in that brief, almost parenthetical reference in the
Declaration of Delhi, which I have already quoted, namely that
with all his independence "the judge is not entitled to act in an
arbitrary manner. His duty is to interpret the law and the fundamental principles and assumptions that underlie it" - a proposition which is not really so far from Marshall's after all. The judge
is made independent of the pressures of the moment so that he
can apply the law.
The individual members of a society of any size must necessarily yield to an individual or a small group the function of establishing the framework of the society, and of laying down general
rules to direct the future action of persons within the society so that
that framework can be maintained. It is apparent in a democratically controlled society that this procedure must be based on give
and take, compromise, and an adjustment of the desires of many
persons and classes of persons, but that decisions must ultimately
be taken by the empowered group. The legitimacy of the decisions
rests upon the authority of the group making the selection, and can
rest on nothing else.
When policy has been in existence, however, a feeling arises
that the individual has a right to the correct application of that
policy to his particular situation. When one person's desires run
counter to those of another in a context in which it can be argued
that certain established policies are relevant, then in the eyes of
the persons affected the legitimacy of the decision which prefers
the one over the other no longer rests upon the authority of the
decider. They will be less interested in the wisdom of the decision
than in its correctness. Which is only to say that men believe in the
depths of their beings that they have rights, that those rights are
described by law, and that although their rights must from time to
time be determined, they should not in the process be affected by
the fiat of any person. Sir John Salmond put his finger on this
point in the following comment:
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"One of the chief advantages derived from the maintenance
of a body of fixed legal rules which are not subject to the
'arbitrium' of its administration is that on this basis rests the
prestige and power of the administration of justice. The law
is impartial. It has no respect of persons. Just or unjust, wise
or foolish, it is the same for all, and for this reason men readily
submit to its arbitrament. In the application and enforcement
of a fixed and predetermined rule, alike for all and not made
for or regarding his own case alone, a man will willingly
acquiesce. But to the 'ipse dixit' of a court, however just or
impartial, men are not so constituted as to afford the same
ready obedience and respect." 3
The subject which I want to investigate today, then, is the connection between the literal meaning of the words "Rule of Law" and
the behavior of judges; law as an external control over judicial
decision; the rule of law from the standpoint of the substantive law,
so to speak. Until recent years there was a traditional explanation
of this connection which was accepted with little question by the
great majority of American Ia-\vyers. It would have been consistent
with Marshall's statement quoted above, that is, it would have
pictured law as the governor and the judge as mere agent. Such a
view, which seeks to eliminate judicial will from the picture entirely, seems to require a conception of law as being at any time a
complete and existing system. It has not all been expressed in
words, but it is all there, nevertheless, and the judge has but one
function, which is to find the law and apply it to the facts. It is the
law which governs us therefore, rather than the judge, who serves
only as a selector mechanism to determine which is the correct
rule for the disposition of the case.
Any thoughtful person will detect in this conception a large
element of fiction. It is enough to suggest Gray's ironic comment,
"What was the law in the time of Richard Coeur de Lion on the
liability of a telegraph company to the persons to whom a message
was sent?"4 Since I do not believe that the la,vyers who existed
prior to the last two generations were by any means so dull a lot as
a contrary conclusion would indicate, I am also inclined to doubt
that it is sound to think of it as a conscious attempt at scientific
description. It did, however, represent a view which at one time
was generally held as to the attitude which the judge should bring
8 SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD, The Modem Legal Philosophy Series. Introduction by
John W. Salmond, p. 1xxxi (1921).
4 GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF TilE LAW 96 (1909).
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to his task; that it should be his objective to deal with the case
before him in that way which was indicated by an interpretation of
existing authorities, rather than in that way which seemed to him
on the facts to be the fairest or most desirable from a social point
of view. It called for the subordination of his judgment to that of
the collectivity of his predecessors, for a primary reliance on a
reasoned extrapolation of accumulated experience.
This view of matters, as you well know, has undergone extensive criticism in recent decades. The criticism has pertained to the
conception or definition of law, to the description of judicial
activity, and to the concept of judicial obligation which are implicit in it. Viewed in perspective, the criticism was a continuation
of an earlier debate, and accounted for the final phase in the
Descent of the Law, which had once been viewed as a system of
precepts having, according to one's bent, either a supernatural or
a natural authority, but is now conceived by some to exist only
in case-by-case incarnations.
The observations of the pragmatic critics have greatly increased
understanding of the judicial process. They have been absorbed
into contemporary legal thought, and it is not likely that they will
soon be dislodged. In the end, however, they do not seem to have
accounted satisfactorily for the influence which law exerts on the
decision of a case. Part of the difficulty, I believe, was that the
· debate became preoccupied with the relationship between rules
and law and rules and decisions. It was proved many times that as
Holmes so gruffly put it, "General propositions do not decide concrete cases."5 This comment loses some of its sting when one considers that for the common-law lawyer at least, the law does not
consist of a set of general propositions. General propositions,
those which could sensibly be described as "rules," make up only
the crudest framework of the law, and are likely to be only shorthand labels for results. The general language is only the starting
point for analysis, for the fact situation which is the case is always
much more complex than the rule. The content of any rule is
known in detail only after all cases in which it has been accepted or
rejected as a statement of the result are known and compared with
the case at hand. The mere fact that the "rule" does not give the
answer, therefore, does not mean that the decision has not been controlled by law, for the case is decided according to law so long as
it is decided consistently with past instances.
5

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
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But there is a more fundamental difficulty. It appears in our
habits of speech, and for that reason is most difficult to exorcise.
It is apparent in the phrase which has been made the theme for
this series of lectures, for the expression "Rule of Law" is most
outrageously elliptical, if it is anything more than metaphor. Law
in itself cannot rule or control anything or anybody. Whatever
it is, it is a causal factor in any event only because men refer to it
and use it as a guide to their conduct. It consists only of ideas,
some of which are written down, others of which are not to be
found any place in ·writing, but occur to the trained laivyer or the
judge when he studies those which have been written down. Despite all this, we habitually speak of the law doing this and the law
doing that, as if it were a person or an active force. We speak of
rules of law, legal rights and legal duties as if they were observable
facts, as if they had an existence outside the minds of men. This
thought pattern, which attempts to make a thing or a person out of
a mere thought, easily leads to disillusion, for it is quickly recognized that every event which is habitually ascribed to the law is
actually the product of the mind, the will and the act of some
identifiable human being. It may then be concluded that the importance of the law has been overemphasized, that its influence is
largely fictitious, that it should not be permitted to stand in the way
of a solution which, to the mind of the judge, would be superior
from the point of view of practical considerations, and that a more
rewarding subject for study may be the chemistry of the human
beings who have the power to make decisions which affect the interests of other human beings: in other words, that the basic problem of the law is a personnel problem.
Although the law consists solely of ideas, the great bulk of those
ideas are already given when the particular judge or Ia-ivyer comes
upon the scene. They are found in an extensive literature with
which he has learned to work, and are ideas concerning action
under various circumstances which, because they are derived from
that literature, members of the community, including the judg~s,
consider to be binding upon themselves and upon others. Though
they are commonly called "rules" they are far more complex than
that name would suggest. The feeling of obligation, rather than
the verbal form in which they appear, is their most important characteristic. Without it they would be totally ineffective. Your legal
"rights," including those which are regarded most basic, are nothing more than complexes of these ideas, and are therefore entirely
dependent upon this feeling of obligation, operating upon your
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neighbor to induce him not to "invade your rights," and upon
officials and judges to induce them to exert the coercive power
which they have at their disposal if he does. The feeling of obligation does its most significant work by minimizing the necessity for
that coercive power to be used. It is also this feeling of obligation
which controls the actions of officials so that they do not become
oppressors.
The literal content of the phrase "Rule of Law," then, has probably been misleading, for it misplaces the responsibility. It suggests that the law is the active factor, and the judge merely passive
instrument, which is transparently not the case. The judge is
obviously the actor; he is not controlled in any physical sense; at
most he responds to a feeling of obligation to decide the case in such
a way that the decision will be consistent with the ideas which he
finds in the existing authoritative literature, which is precisely
the same motivating factor as that which activates any layman
presented with a choice between two courses of conduct, one of
which he deems to be illegal. On the other hand, if the system is
to work at all that feeling of obligation must be preserved. There
must be a theory at least that by a proper examination of the materials one can find an imperative solution. It must be assumed
that the materials establish a pattern of conduct to which the individual, be he citizen or official, is "bound" to adhere. If it is
not, then the result seems inescapable that - not the judges - but
the individual judge becomes the measure of all things, for judges
as a group have no way of reaching consensus, and if they did, their
contemporary consensus could be no more binding upon individual
judges than that which exists by virtue of past decisions.
The point which a realistic examination of the facts makes clear,
then, is not that there can be no "Rule of Law," in the sense in
which I have been using the term, so far as the judicial process is
concerned, but is rather the extent to which the realization of this
ideal depends upon judicial discipline, upon a desire by judges and
other officials, a feeling on their part of compulsion or obligation.
Without that feeling there would in fact be no external control
over the judge's decision, and our judicial government would harbor within itself the same faults which the judges have so long
sought to guard against in the other branches.
This discipline has proved in the past to be a rugged growth,
but it can be destroyed. Judge Hutcheson saw this twenty years
ago when he said:
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"I think the probable source of the only danger we have to
fear from the court today is the . . . too complete acceptance
of Gray's notion that judges don't find the law like they do
the eggs on Easter Day, that they make it like the legislatures
do, against Blackstone's and Carter's, that they find it. When
you have that notion in mind very strongly and everybody
lets you talk out in meeting and say, decisions are in reality
legislation, a great many judges want to be legislating and not
just judging. . . . [I]f this idea is run into the ground and
you get to a place where you have the power to legislate, administer and adjudicate at the same time, and all from the
same bench, like Brer' Fox said to Brer' Rabbit, 'You is getting to be a mighty big man - too big.' " 6
The process by which the ideas of which the law consists are
originated and given their imperative nature has generally been
called "legislation." The term includes at one extreme the establishment of policy in the broadest terms, the writing of the master
plan for the society, and at the other the promulgation of regulations in the picayune detail of the building codes. The difference
in function at these two extremes is so great that one might have
expected a difference in nomenclature to have developed. It has,
of course, been recognized in connection with the division of labor
between legislative and administrative bodies. It appears, however,
to be growing ever more vague along the frontier between courts
and legislatures. It is characteristic of our system that the great
bulk of the law relating to private rights and duties was left to the
origination of judges. They started with crude ideas which they
redefined and elaborated over many generations to produce the
body of doctrine with which the Anglo-American Ia-vvyer now
works. The process continues, and it is inevitable that it should.
Each case that is brought to court and decided adds a new detail to
the legal idea which the court uses for its disposition - a detail
which was not there before. Recent generations of legal scholars
have scorned the assumption of their predecessors that the process
involves merely an uncovering of pre-existing principles, and have
made much of the point that it is legislative in character. Few
today would dispute that characterization, taking into account its
generality, which is so gross, however, that the characterization is
remarkably unenlightening. If it refers only to the fact that a large
6 Comments at the Cincinnati Conference on Status of the Rule of Judicial Precedent,
14 u. CrNC. L. REv. 203,248 (1940).

510

MICHIGAN

LAw

REVIEW

[Vol. 59

body of doctrine exists today which had no existence a thousand
years ago, and that the bulk of it is attributable to the innovation
of judges, it merely states the obvious. Aside from this, however, it
is possible from our vantage point in time to look back over the
centuries and pick out numerous instances of judicial decisions
which were by no means required by existing authority and which
became entirely new stocks of descent, so that it can be argued that
they changed the shape of the law in major respects. I would venture the guess that in very few of those instances could the deciding court foresee the implications which would ultimately be found
in his decision; in very few instances, therefore, was it felt that
the decision was a major departure, and that the court was assuming
responsibility for societal planning in any substantial respect.
Such notions, once they have gained wide acceptance, are likely
to be taken seriously, however. This one, derived from a history
of casual common law growth, has served to encourage arguments
favoring changes in the law addressed to lawyers and judges rather
than to legislators in the interest of broad programs of law reform,
and as an entering wedge for the acceptance of these arguments by
the judges. Without regard to the merits of these programs, if they
are accepted by judges as guides for decision, then in my opinion
there will have been a significant change in the mechanics of government. The change is subtle; it has occurred or is occurring
gradually, and would be difficult to identify, for it is in large part
only a change in attitude, in the degree of judicial commitment to
the idea that pre-existing law should govern decisions. Practical
consequences will be clear only after a period of years has expired.
I shall therefore leave it to you from your own consciousness of
judicial attitudes to say whether that change is taking place. If it
is, when it is coupled with our codeless tradition, the result may be
the assumption by judges of a major segment of the planning function in our society. This is a point which I believe non-Ia-wyer students of politics do not fully appreciate. They have come perforce
to recognize the extent to which a court can remould a constitution
or a statute in its own image. How many non-Ia-wyers, however,
comprehend the vastness of the reaches of the common law, the extent to which the daily workings of the social machine are regulated
by the deposit of past judicial decisions rather than by enacted law,
and the potential importance, therefore, of a general judicial attitude that that which judges have done may also by judges be undone?
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The most obvious comment upon such a development is that it
works a basic alteration in the relationship between people and
government by the will of the officials concerned, with no review by
any other body, no reference to the people, and probably, because
of the esoteric nature of the change, without widespread knowledge
that it has occurred. Conflicts between court and legislature or
court and executive make the headlines, and are subjected to exhaustive criticism. There is little drama, however, and less publicity, when the court changes a traditional rule of the common law.
Any debate which may take place rarely extends beyond the ranks
of the profession. But aside from this point, which relates to the
assumption of significant powers by a governing group without
authorization by the governed, what can be said about the merits
of a system in which the judges are given the major responsibility
for law reform, at least in fields not expressly pre-empted by the
legislature?
Such an arrangement has been praised for the reason that it is
said to bring to bear upon the problems of private law the special
governing expertise of the judiciary. The judge, it is suggested,
is in a peculiarly strategic position to recognize developing needs
and keep the law responsive to them. This is a point at which I
must confess bafflement. It seems to be assumed by this argument,
much as it was once assumed about the law, that "social needs" are
objectively determinable, that they can be observed and knmm,
that the judge's function, therefore, is to uncover them and use
them as guides for decision. If this assumption were sound, it
would still seem that the needs which ought to be served arise out
of developments in a world to which the judge is an outsider, a
mere onlooker. He has no special source of worldly knowledge, and
no apparatus for gathering the factual information essential to the
formation of intelligent decisions of a forward-looking, policymaking, society-shaping variety. If he were to take the time to make
his own investigation, it could only be at the expense of the pressing needs of the litigants on his already crowded docket. Without
independent investigation he must act on the basis of arguments
presented by counsel for the parties who happen to be engaged in
litigation before him. The ultimate social implications of those
arguments can scarcely be the responsibility of the advocates if the
purposes of the adversary method are to be maintained. Consequently the judge's basis for action, typically, is not an objective
view of the situation in its social context, but rather, two opposite,
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extreme, and slanted views. This may be an adequate basis for the
decision of disputes between individual parties each of whom has
had a fair chance under controlled conditions to present the best
reasons why he should prevail. It can hardly be advanced as an
ideal milieu for policy making.
More basic than this objection, however, is the fact that social
needs are no more real, discoverable objects than is the law. An
investigation will not identify them because they do not exist. It is
grossly misleading to conceive of the judge as a sculptor who sits
at his bench to mould the law so that its lines are congruent with
an object before him, called "social needs." The minds of individual human beings harbor many desires. In the nature of things
not all of them can be satisfied. So that some can be, others must
be frustrated. What we are discussing is simply this - whether
those persons who are from time to time placed in judicial office
shall have the power to make the master choices between those
desires which may be satisfied and those which must be frustrated.
If the conception is maintained that the important choices, those
which affect whole classes of persons, should be made in legislative
halls, they will be worked out by a bargaining process. The persons
who have the desires, or advocates for their positions, will be heard.
Their arguments may very probably be selfishly motivated, and
will no doubt be valued quite frankly in political terms. Deals will
be struck, adjustments made, and in the end there will be a compromise solution which can secure the consent of a majority of the
legislative representatives selected by those who will be subject
to it. The result may be esthetically or even morally offensive,
and extremely frustrating to selfless reformers who have been able
to construct for themselves an ideal master plan for society. I have
the impression, however, that these are the implications of popularly elected, representative government.
To me, then, the phrase "Rule of Law" as applied to the
judicial process stands for more than a guarantee of fair play, more
than a hands-off attitude toward certain of the more highly intellectualized desires of men, more than a stipulation that private disputes shall be disposed of on a reasoned basis. In addition to these
tremendously important values, it suggests a whole complex of
ideas concerning the function of the judge, his attitude toward the
law, and the relationship between law and decision. I have no
illusions that the law can furnish a mechanical control over the
behavior of the judge, however enthusiastic he may be for the idea
that he should be or is so controlled. I am fully aware of the fact
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that a respectable legal argument can be made on both sides of
almost any question sufficiently vexing to come before a judge at
all, and that certainty in advance of decision can therefore never be
achieved. I am content with the knowledge that law in the long run
is only a branch or a special manifestation of morals, fitted out with
some enforcement machinery which works only imperfectly at best,
but which would break down completely in the absence of a desire
to obey responded to by individuals. If this is the basis for its
effectiveness so far as people generally are concerned, then there
is no reason why judges should not be similarly affected, and the
proposition which has been maintained that a "government of laws
and not of men" is a fiction, impossible of attainment, results from
a misinterpretation of the metaphor which that expression is.
The Rule of Law is at most an ideal. It can neither be
demonstrated nor enforced, but only advocated. It can, however,
be destroyed by too thoroughgoing and too widespread a skepticism. I do not mean, of course, that the better understanding of
realities which exists because of the critical writing of the past fifty
years can or should be suppressed. It would seem, however, that
the judge who has discovered the freedom and the power which are
his should be chastened rather than elated by the discovery. It is
possible to harbor this knowledge without deriving from it the
conclusion that the judge should convert himself into a ruler, a
manipulator of those who have reposed in him a very special trust.
Hayek has recently said, "If the ideal of the rule of law is a firm
element of public opinion, legislation and jurisdiction will tend to
approach it more and more closely. But if it is represented as an
impracticable and even undesirable ideal and people cease to strive
for its realization, it will rapidly disappear." 7
I have one further comment before I subside. My argument
has been that the judiciary is not equipped and has not by the people been authorized to undertake an advance planning function for
the law, and through law for society. In the past it was perhaps not
essential that such a function be undertaken by anybody. History
moved slowly enough that the accretionary change and growth of
the common law, supplemented in sensitive areas by enacted law,
took care of newly-developing human desires satisfactorily enough.
It may be that the pressures of galloping technological development
7 HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 206 (1960). I should like also to acknowledge
indebtedness to CAHILL, JUDICIAL LEGISLATION (1952), LUNDSTEDT, LEGAL THINKING REVISED
(1956), and OLIVECRONA, LAw AS FAcr (1939), all of which have been extremely helpful to
me.
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and population growth have so altered the basic situation that this
is no longer true. One does not readily conclude that our legislatures, as currently constituted, are ideal instrumentalities for
keeping the law abreast of the times. An earnest belief on the
part of many students of the law that it is in some respects inadequate and outmoded, coupled with a feeling of discouragement
when the prospect of legislative change is contemplated, puts
increasing pressure upon the judges to assume the responsibility
and the burden of law reform. Proposals for technical law reform
rarely excite interest among legislators, and it may be that there
are very important needs in our society which, because they are dispersed and have no organizational nucleus, are not adequately
voiced. It is quite probable, then, that further attention should be
given to the possibility and design of some special organ of the
legislative branch to which arguments for reform could be addressed for careful and serious study and recommendation. That,
however, would be the subject for another lecture.

